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Big Data for All: Privacy and User Control in the 
Age of Analytics 
By Omer Tene
1
 and Jules Polonetsky
2
 
We live in an age of “big data.”  Data have become the raw material of production, a 
new source for immense economic and social value.  Advances in data mining and 
analytics and the massive increase in computing power and data storage capacity have 
expanded by orders of magnitude the scope of information available for businesses and 
government. Data are now available for analysis in raw form, escaping the confines of 
structured databases and enhancing researchers’ abilities to identify correlations and 
conceive of new, unanticipated uses for existing information.  In addition, the increasing 
number of people, devices, and sensors that are now connected by digital networks has 
revolutionized the ability to generate, communicate, share, and access data.  Data 
creates enormous value for the world economy, driving innovation, productivity, 
efficiency, and growth.  At the same time, the “data deluge” presents privacy concerns 
which could stir a regulatory backlash dampening the data economy and stifling 
innovation.  In order to craft a balance between beneficial uses of data and individual 
privacy, policymakers must address some of the most fundamental concepts of privacy 
law, including the definition of “personally identifiable information,” the role of 
individual control, and the principles of data minimization and purpose limitation.  This 
article emphasizes the importance of providing individuals with access to their data in 
usable format.  This will let individuals share the wealth created by their information and 
incentivize developers to offer user-side features and applications harnessing the value of 
big data.  Where individual access to data is impracticable, data are likely to be de-
identified to an extent sufficient to diminish privacy concerns.  In addition, since in a big 
data world it is often not the data but rather the inferences drawn from them that give 
cause for concern, organizations should be required to disclose their decisional criteria. 
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INTRODUCTION 
¶1  Big data is upon us.3 Over the past few years, the volume of data collected and 
stored by business and government organizations has exploded.
4
 The trend is driven by 
reduced costs of storing information and moving it around in conjunction with increased 
capacity to instantly analyze heaps of unstructured data using modern experimental 
methods, observational and longitudinal studies, and large scale simulations.
5
 Data are 
generated from online transactions, email, video, images, clickstream, logs, search 
queries, health records, and social networking interactions; gleaned from increasingly 
pervasive sensors deployed in infrastructure such as communications networks, electric 
grids, global positioning satellites, roads and bridges,
6






 See, e.g., Steve Lohr, The Age of Big Data, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 11, 2012, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/12/sunday-review/big-datas-impact-in-the-world.html?pagewanted=all; 
Steve Lohr, How Big Data Became So Big, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 11, 2012, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/12/business/how-big-data-became-so-big-unboxed.html; Janna Anderson 
& Lee Rainie, The Future of Big Data, PEW INTERNET & AM. LIFE PROJECT (July 20, 2012),  
http://pewinternet.org/~/media//Files/Reports/2012/PIP_Future_of_Internet_2012_Big_Data.pdf.  
4
 Kenneth Cukier, Data, Data Everywhere, THE ECONOMIST, Feb. 25, 2010, 
http://www.economist.com/node/15557443; see, e.g., World Economic Forum, Big Data, Big Impact: New 
Possibilities for International Development (2012), available at 
http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_TC_MFS_BigDataBigImpact_Briefing_2012.pdf.  
5
 See, e.g., TREVOR HASTIE, ROBERT TIBSHIRANI & JEROME FRIEDMAN, THE ELEMENTS OF STATISTICAL 
LEARNING: DATA MINING, INFERENCE, AND PREDICTION (2009). 
6
 For the erosion of privacy in the public sphere, see United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. ___, 132 S. Ct. 945 
(2012). 
7
 Omer Tene, Privacy: The New Generations, 1 INT’L DATA PRIVACY LAW 15 (2011), available at 
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¶2  The Obama Administration has recently announced a new, multi-agency big data 
research and development initiative aimed at advancing the core scientific and 
technological means of managing, analyzing, visualizing, and extracting information 
from large, diverse, distributed, and heterogeneous data sets.
8
 This initiative is based on 
recognition of the immense social and economic value captured in information and the 
intention to unleash it in order to progress from data to knowledge to action.
9
  Big data 
boosts the economy, transforming traditional business models and creating new 
opportunities through the use of business intelligence, sentiment analysis, and analytics. 
It advances scientific research, transforming scientific methods from hypothesis-driven to 
data-driven discovery.
10
 Big data furthers national goals such as optimization of natural 




¶3  The extraordinary societal benefits of big data—including breakthroughs in 
medicine, data security, and energy use—must be reconciled with increased risks to 
individuals’ privacy.
12
 As is often the case, technological and business developments in 
big data analysis have far outpaced the existing legal frameworks, which date back from 






 News Release, Office of Science and Technology Policy, Executive Office of the President, Obama 
Administration Unveils “Big Data” Initiative: Announces $200 Million in New R&D Investments (Mar. 29, 
2012), http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/microsites/ostp/big_data_press_release.pdf.  
9
 Personal Data: The Emergence of a New Asset Class, WORLD ECONOMIC FORUM (2011), 
http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_ITTC_PersonalDataNewAsset_Report_2011.pdf; Steve Lohr, New 




 See Chris Anderson, The End of Theory: The Data Deluge Makes the Scientific Method Obsolete, 
WIRED, June 23, 2008, available at http://www.wired.com/science/discoveries/magazine/16-07/pb_theory; 
see also Peter Norvig, UBC Department of Computer Science’s Distinguished Lecture Series: The 
Unreasonable Effectiveness of Data, (Sept. 23, 2010), available at 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yvDCzhbjYWs. 
11
 Farnam Jahanian, Assistant Director, National Science Foundation, NSF Keynote at TechAmerica's 
Big Data Congressional Briefing, (May 2, 2012), available at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Do_IPa6-
E9M.  
12
 Omer Tene & Jules Polonetsky, Privacy in the Age of Big Data: A Time for Big Decisions, 64 STAN. 
L. REV. ONLINE 63 (2012). 
13
 See OECD Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Data, ORG. 
FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV. (Sept. 23, 1980), 
http://www.oecd.org/document/18/0,3343,en_2649_34255_1815186_1_1_1_1,00.html [hereinafter: OECD 
Guidelines]; Council of Europe Convention 108 for the Protection of Individuals with Regard to Automatic 
Processing of Personal Data, Strasbourg, (Jan. 28, 1982), 
http://conventions.coe.int/treaty/en/treaties/html/108.htm; Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament 
and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of 
Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31 (Nov. 23, 1995), available at 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:1995:281:0031:0050:EN:PDF [hereinafter: 
European Data Protection Directive]; and in the United States: The Privacy Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-
579, 88 Stat. 1897 (Dec. 31, 1974). All of the major frameworks are being reviewed this year. See The 
White House, Consumer Data Privacy in a Networked World: A Framework for Protecting Privacy and 
Promoting Innovation in the Global Digital Economy, (Feb. 2012), 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/privacy-final.pdf [hereinafter: White House Blueprint]; 
Federal Trade Commission Report, Protecting Consumer Privacy in an Era of Rapid Change: 
Recommendations for Businesses and Policymakers (Mar. 2012), 
http://ftc.gov/os/2012/03/120326privacyreport.pdf [hereinafter: FTC Final Report]; Proposal for a 
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For the past four decades, the tension between data innovation and informational privacy 
has been moderated by a set of principles broadly referred to as the Fair Information 
Practice Principles (FIPPs), based on a framework set in the 1980 OECD Guidelines.
14
 In 
the latest version presented by the White House this year, the FIPPs include the principles 
of individual control, transparency, respect for context, security, access and accuracy, 
focused collection, and accountability.
15
 The big data paradigm challenges some of these 
fundamental principles, including the scope of the framework (often addressed by 
framing the term “personally identifiable information” (PII)), the concepts of data 
minimization (“focused collection”) and consent (“individual control” and “respect for 
context”), and the right of individual access (“access and accuracy”).
16
  
¶4  This article addresses the legal issues arising from the big data debate. It suggests 
that the FIPPs should be viewed as a set of levers that must be adjusted to adapt to 
varying business and technological conditions. Indeed, the ingenuity of the FIPPs is 
manifest in their flexibility, which has made them resilient to momentous change—some 
principles retract while others expand depending on the circumstances. In the context of 
big data, this means relaxing data minimization and consent requirements while 
emphasizing transparency, access, and accuracy. The shift is from empowering 
individuals at the point of information collection, which traditionally revolved around 
opting into or out of seldom read, much less understood corporate privacy policies, to 
allowing them to engage with and benefit from information already collected, thereby 
harnessing big data for their own personal usage. Further, such exposure will prevent the 
existence of “secret” databases and leverage societal pressure to constrain any 
unacceptable uses.  
¶5  This article assesses the definition of PII in a world where de-identification is often 
reversible and sometimes detrimental to the integrity of the very data it aims to protect. It 
seeks to reconcile the current technological and business realities with the data 
minimization and purpose limitation principles. These principles are antithetical to big 
data, which is premised on data maximization—a theory that posits that the more data 
processed, the finer the conclusions—and seeks to uncover surprising, unanticipated 
correlations.  
¶6  This article suggests that to solve the big data privacy quandary, individuals must 
be offered meaningful rights to access their data in a usable, machine-readable format. 
This, in turn, will unleash a wave of innovation for user-side applications and services 




Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the protection of individuals with regard to 
the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data (General Data Protection 
Regulation), COM(2012) 11 final (Jan. 25, 2012), available at http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-
protection/document/review2012/com_2012_11_en.pdf [hereinafter: EU General Data Protection 
Regulation].  
14
 OECD, supra note 13, at 4. The OECD (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development) 
Guidelines include the principles of collection limitation, data quality, purpose specification, use limitation, 
security safeguards, openness, individual participation, and accountability.  
15
 White House, supra note 13, at 4. 
16
 Julie Brill, Commissioner, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Remarks at Fordham University School of Law: Big 
Data, Big Issues (Mar. 2, 2012) (transcript available at 
http://ftc.gov/speeches/brill/120228fordhamlawschool.pdf). Federal Trade Commission Commissioner 
Julie Brill said: “Big Data’s impact on privacy is requiring some new and hard thinking by all of us.”  
17
 See discussion infra notes 138 to 162 and accompanying text. 
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Featurization will allow individuals to declare their own policies, preferences and terms 
of engagement, and do it in ways that can be automated both for them and for the 
companies they engage.
18
 Where individual access to data is impracticable, data are likely 
to be de-identified to an extent sufficient to diminish privacy concerns.
19
 Where access is 
possible, organizations must provide it with robust mechanisms for user authentication 
and through secure channels to prevent leakage. This implies the development of user-
centric or federated identity management schemes, which include single sign-on 
capability and at the same time do not become vehicles for universal surveillance.
20
   
¶7  To minimize concerns of untoward data usage, organizations should disclose the 
logic underlying their decision-making processes to the extent possible without 
compromising their trade secrets or intellectual property rights. As danah boyd and Kate 
Crawford recently noted: “In reality, working with Big Data is still subjective, and what it 
quantifies does not necessarily have a closer claim on objective truth . . . .”
21
 It is 
imperative that individuals have insight into the decisional criteria of organizations lest 
they face a Kafkaesque machinery that manipulates lives based on opaque justifications. 
While we recognize the practical difficulties of mandating disclosure without 
compromising organizations’ “secret sauce,” we trust that a distinction can be drawn 
between proprietary algorithms, which would remain secret, and decisional criteria, 
which would be disclosed.  
¶8  Part One will describe some of the benefits of big data to individuals and society at 
large, including medical research, smart grid information, and traffic management. Some 
instances of big data use are so compelling that few would argue they should be forgone 
in light of the incremental risk to individuals’ privacy. Part Two discusses some of the 
risks of big data, including the unidirectional, incremental chipping away at informational 
privacy; the social stratification exacerbated by predictive analysis; and the exclusion of 
individuals from the value generated by their own information. Part Three addresses the 
challenges big data poses to existing privacy rules, including the definition of PII, the 
principle of data minimization, and the concept of meaningful, informed consent. Part 
Four argues the benefits of providing individuals with useful access to their data, 
allowing them to share the gains generated by the combination of their information with 
resources invested by businesses and government. Part Four also introduces arguments 
for requiring organizations to be transparent with respect to the decisional criteria 
underlying their big data choices. 
I. BIG DATA: BIG BENEFITS 
¶9  Big data is a big industry. Research conducted at the Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology shows that companies that use “data-directed decisionmaking” enjoy a 5%–
6% increase in productivity.
22
 There is a strong link between effective data management 
 
18
 See Doc Searls, The Customer as a God, WALL ST. J., July 20, 2012, available at 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10000872396390444873204577535352521092154.html.  
19
 See discussion infra note 169 and accompanying text. 
20
 See, e.g., Ann Cavoukian, 7 Laws Of Identity: The Case for Privacy-Embedded Laws Of Identity in 
the Digital Age (2006), http://www.identityblog.com/wp-content/resources/7_laws_whitepaper.pdf.  
21
 danah boyd & Kate Crawford, Critical Questions for Big Data, 15 INFO. COMM. & SOC’Y 662, 667 
(June 2012).  
22
 Erik Brynjolfsson, Lorin Hitt & Heekyung Kim, Strength in Numbers: How Does Data-Driven 
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strategy and financial performance. Companies that use data most effectively stand out 
from the rest. A report by the McKinsey Global Institute (MGI) demonstrates the 
transformative effect that big data has had on entire sectors ranging from health care to 
retail to manufacturing to political campaigns.
23
 Just as it helps businesses increase 
productivity, big data allows governments to improve public sector administration and 
assists global organizations in analyzing information to devise strategic planning. 
Demand for big data is accelerating. MGI projected that the United States already needs 




¶10  This chapter presents some anecdotal examples of the benefits of big data. When 
considering the risks that big data poses to individual privacy, policymakers should be 
mindful of its sizable benefits. Privacy impact assessments (PIA), systematic processes 
undertaken by government and business organizations to evaluate the potential risks to 
privacy of products, projects or schemes, often fail to bring these benefits into account.
25
 
Concluding that a project raises privacy risks is not sufficient to discredit it. Privacy risks 
must be weighed against non-privacy rewards. And while numerous mechanisms exist to 
assess privacy risks,
26
 we still lack a formula to work out the balance.
27
  
¶11  At the same time, under existing market conditions, the benefits of big data do not 
always (some say, ever) accrue to the individuals whose personal data are collected and 
harvested.
28
 This creates a twofold problem: on the one hand, individuals should not be 
required to volunteer their information with little benefit beyond feeding voracious 
corporate appetites; on the other hand, self interest should not frustrate societal values 
and benefits such as economic development or improved capabilities for law enforcement 
 
Decision-Making Affect Firm Performance? A51 (Apr. 2011), 
http://www.a51.nl/storage/pdf/SSRN_id1819486.pdf; see supra note 9, at 3 (commenting on recent WEF 
report referring to personal data as “the new oil,” a new asset class emerging as the most valuable resource 
of the 21st century).    
23
 James Manyika et al., Big Data: The Next Frontier for Innovation, Competition, and Productivity, 
MCKINSEY GLOBAL INSTITUTE (May 2011), 
http://www.mckinsey.com/Insights/MGI/Research/Technology_and_Innovation/Big_data_The_next_fronti
er_for_innovation [hereinafter MGI Report]; see also Thomas B. Edsall, Let the Nanotargeting Begin, NY 
TIMES CAMPAIGN STOPS BLOG (Apr. 15, 2012, 10:39 PM), 
http://campaignstops.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/04/15/let-the-nanotargeting-begin.  
24
 Ben Rooney, Big Data’s Big Problem: Little Talent, WALL ST. J. TECH EUROPE (Apr. 26, 2012), 
http://blogs.wsj.com/tech-europe/2012/04/26/big-datas-big-problem-little-talent/?mod=google_news_blog.   
25
 E-Government Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107–347, § 208, 44 U.S.C. § 101 (2003); EU General Data 
Protection Regulation, art. 33–34.  
26
 See, e.g., Roger Clarke, An Evaluation of Privacy Impact Assessment Guidance Documents, 1 INT’L 
DATA PRIVACY LAW 111 (2011); U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, PRIVACY IMPACT 
ASSESSMENT (PIA) GUIDE (Jan. 2007), http://www.sec.gov/about/privacy/piaguide.pdf; U.S. Department of 
Homeland Security, PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENTS, THE PRIVACY OFFICE OFFICIAL GUIDANCE (June 
2010),  http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/privacy/privacy_pia_guidance_june2010.pdf; U.S. Department 
of Justice, Office of Privacy and Civil Liberties, PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENTS, OFFICIAL GUIDANCE 
(Aug. 2010), http://www.justice.gov/opcl/pia_manual.pdf.  
27
 For example, if analysis of de-identified online search engine logs enabled identification of a life 
threatening epidemic in x% of cases thus saving y lives, should such analysis be permitted assuming a z% 
chance of re-identification of a certain subset of search engine users? This is a meta-privacy question, 
which must be answered by policymakers implementing more than just a PIA; the PIA only solves one side 
of the equation. 
28
 See, e.g., Natasha Singer, Consumer Data, but Not for Consumers, N.Y. TIMES, July 21, 2012, 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/22/business/acxiom-consumer-data-often-unavailable-to-
consumers.html.  
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and public health authorities. If individuals could reap some of the gains of big data, they 
would be incentivized to actively participate in the data economy, aligning their own self-
interest with broader societal goals. 
A. Healthcare 
¶12  Dr. Russ Altman, a professor of medicine and bioengineering at Stanford 
University, and his colleagues made a groundbreaking discovery last year. They found 
that when taken together, Paxil®—the blockbuster antidepressant prescribed to millions 
of Americans—and Pravachol®—a highly popular cholesterol-reducing drug—have a 
dreadful side effect: they increase patients’ blood glucose to diabetic levels. Each drug 
taken alone does not have the diabetic side effects; hence, the Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA) approved the drugs for use. The FDA, which has limited 
resources, cannot afford to test each and every drug for every conceivable interaction.  
¶13  Altman and his team made their discovery by pursuing statistical analysis and data 
mining techniques to identify patterns in large datasets. They analyzed information in the 
Adverse Event Reporting System (AERS), a database maintained by the FDA to collect 
adverse drug event reports from clinicians, patients, and drug companies for more than 
thirty years.
29
 Using the AERS, they created a “symptomatic footprint” for diabetes-
inducing drugs (i.e., the side effects a patient might report if she had undiagnosed 
diabetes), then searched for that footprint in interactions between pairs of drugs not 
known to induce such effects when taken alone. Four pairs of drugs were found to leave 
the footprint; of those, Paxil and Pravachol were the most commonly prescribed.  
¶14  Next, the scientists approached Microsoft Research to examine de-identified Bing 
search engine logs,
30
 querying whether a higher proportion of users who searched for 
both “Paxil” and “Pravachol” also typed in words related to the “symptomatic footprint” 
(such as “headache” or “fatigue”) than those who searched for just Paxil or Pravachol 
separately. Sure enough, their research hypothesis found support in that big data set as 
well. Users who searched Bing for the name of both drugs together were much likelier to 






 Adverse Event Reporting System (AERS), FOOD AND DRUG ADMIN., 
http://www.fda.gov/drugs/guidancecomplianceregulatoryinformation/surveillance/adversedrugeffects/defau
lt.htm (last updated Sept. 10, 2012). 
30
 Through de-identification, organizations can reduce privacy risks associated with data while still 
salvaging such data for beneficial use. De-identification could be achieved through various techniques such 
as data masking (stripping out obvious personal identifiers such as names from a piece of information, to 
create a data set in which no person identifiers are present); pseudonymization (de-identifying data so that a 
coded reference or pseudonym is attached to a record to allow the data to be associated with a particular 
individual without the individual being identified); aggregation (data is displayed as totals, so no data 
relating to or identifying any individual is shown; small numbers in totals are often suppressed through 
‘blurring’ or by being omitted altogether); and more. See Information Commissioner’s Office, 
ANONYMISATION: MANAGING DATA PROTECTION RISK CODE OF PRACTICE, Nov. 2012, 
http://www.ico.gov.uk/news/latest_news/2012/~/media/documents/library/Data_Protection/Practical_applic
ation/anonymisation_code.ashx.   
31
 See 2012 Stanford Law Review Symposium, The Privacy Paradox: Health and Medical Privacy, 
YOUTUBE (Feb. 27, 2012), 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ntL4WMGkiXo&feature=player_embedded#! (Altman describing the 
research process, including the search engine logs analysis, from minute 32 of the video).  
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¶15  By implementing a novel signal detection algorithm that identifies statistically 
significant correlations, the researchers were thus able to parse out latent adverse effect 
signals from spontaneous reporting systems.
32
 In 2009, for example, “there were an 
estimated 15 million prescriptions for paroxetine [Paxil] and 18 million prescriptions for 
pravastatin [Pravachol] in the United States”; there were an estimated one million 
individuals who used both drugs in combination.
33
 For these users, the work of Altman 
and his colleagues was potentially life-saving.
34
 
¶16  In addition to the findings of Altman and his team, there are numerous other 
examples of significant healthcare breakthroughs based on big data analysis. The 
discovery of Vioxx’s adverse drug effects, which led to its withdrawal from the market, 
was made possible by analysis of clinical and cost data collected by Kaiser Permanente, 
the California-based managed-care consortium.
35
 Had Kaiser Permanente not aggregated 
clinical and cost data, researchers might not have been able to attribute 27,000 cardiac 
arrest deaths occurring between 1999 and 2003 to use of the drug. 
¶17  In another example, researchers in South Africa discovered a positive relationship 
between therapeutic vitamin B use and delay of progression to AIDS and death in HIV-
positive patients.
36
 This was a critical finding at a time and in a region where therapies 
for people living with HIV are well beyond the financial means of most patients. The 
researchers noted that “[n]onlinear statistical analysis . . . can help elucidate clinically-
relevant relationships within a large patient population such as observational 
databases.”
37
 Another oft-cited example is Google Flu Trends, which predicts and locates 
outbreaks of the flu making use of information—aggregate search queries—not originally 
collected with this innovative application in mind. Of course, “[e]arly detection of disease 
activity, when followed by rapid response, can reduce the impact of both seasonal and 
pandemic influenza.”
38
  Yet another example is the National Retail Data Monitor 
(NRDM), which keeps tabs on sales of over-the-counter healthcare items from 21,000 
outlets across the United States. By analyzing the remedies people purchase, health 
officials can anticipate short-term trends in illness transmission. “Data from the NRDM 
show that sales of over-the-counter products like cough medicine and electrolytes . . . 
spike before visits to the emergency room do,” and that the lead-time can be significant—





 See also David Reshef et al., Detecting Novel Associations in Large Data Sets, 334 SCIENCE 1518, 
1520 (2011).    
33
 Nicholas Tatonetti et al., Detecting Drug Interactions From Adverse-Event Reports: Interaction 
Between Paroxetine and Pravastatin Increases Blood Glucose Levels, 90 CLINICAL PHARMACOLOGY & 
THERAPEUTICS 133, 133, 139 (2011).  
34
 See Nicholas Tatonetti et al., A Novel Signal Detection Algorithm for Identifying Hidden Drug-Drug 
Interactions in Adverse Event Reports, 12 J. AM. MED. INFORMATICS ASS’N 79, 79–80 (2011). 
35
 See, e.g., Rita Rubin, How Did Vioxx Debacle Happen?, USA TODAY (Oct. 12, 2004, 12:00 AM), 
available at http://www.usatoday.com/news/health/2004-10-12-vioxx-cover_x.htm.  
36
 Andrew Kanter et al., Supplemental Vitamin B and Progression to AIDS and Death in Black South 





 Jeremy Ginsberg et al., Detecting Influenza Epidemics Using Search Engine Query Data, 457 
NATURE 1012, 1012 (2009).  
39
 Brian Fung, Using Data Mining to Predict Epidemics Before They Spread, THE ATLANTIC, May 2, 
2012, http://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2012/05/using-data-mining-to-predict-epidemics-before-
they-spread/256605.  
Vol. 11:5] Omer Tene and Jules Polonetsky 
 247 
to a study published in a medical journal, it took weeks for official sources in Haiti to 
report details of a cholera epidemic in 2010, resulting in more than 7,000 casualties and 
500,000 infections, whereas on Twitter, news of the disease traveled far more quickly.
40
  
¶18  The potential advantages of big data analytics within the medical field have 
resulted in public policy initiatives to mine and leverage such data. David Cameron, 
Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, recently announced that every NHS patient 
would henceforth be a “research patient” whose medical record would be “opened up” 
for research by private healthcare firms.
41
 The Prime Minister emphasized that privacy-
conscious patients would be given opt out rights. He added that “this does not threaten 
privacy, it doesn't mean anyone can look at your health records, but it does mean using 
anonymous data to make new medical breakthroughs.” While a significant driver for 
research and innovation, the health sector is not the only arena for groundbreaking big 
data use. 
B. Mobile 
¶19  Mobile devices–always on, location aware, and with multiple sensors including 
cameras, microphones, movement sensors, GPS, and Wi-Fi capabilities–have 
revolutionized the collection of data in the public sphere and enabled innovative data 
harvesting and use. A group of scientists working on a collaborative project at MIT, 
Harvard, and additional research universities is currently analyzing mobile phone 
communications to better understand the needs of the one billion people who live in 
settlements or slums in developing countries.
42
 They explore ways to predict food 
shortages using variables such as market prices, drought, migrations, previous regional 
production, and seasonal variations;
43
 to quantify crime waves by tracking the time, 
place, and nature of criminal activity in locations across a city;
 44
 and to decide which 






  See Rumi Chunara et al., Social and News Media Enable Estimation of Epidemiological Patterns 
Early in the 2010 Haitian Cholera Outbreak, 86 AM. J. TROP. MED. HYG. 39 (2012); see also Alessio 
Signorini et al., The Use of Twitter to Track Levels of Disease Activity and Public Concern in the U.S. 
During the Influenza H1N1 Pandemic, PLOS ONE (May 2011), 
http://www.divms.uiowa.edu/~asignori/papers/use-twitter-track-level-disease-activity-and-concern-in-us-
during-h1n1.pdf.   
41
 See, e.g., Everyone 'to be research patient', says David Cameron, BBC NEWS, Dec. 5, 2011, 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-16026827.  
42
 See Big Data for Social Good Initiative, HARVARD SCHOOL OF PUBLIC HEALTH: ENGINEERING SOCIAL 
SYSTEMS, http://www.hsph.harvard.edu/ess/bigdata.html (last visited April 2, 2013); see also Amy 
Wesolowski & Nathan Eagle, Parameterizing the Dynamics of Slums, PROCEEDINGS OF AAAI ARTIFICIAL 
INTELLIGENCE FOR DEVELOPMENT (AI-D'10), http://ai-d.org/pdfs/Wesolowski.pdf (last visited December 2, 
2012).  
43
 See, e.g., Washington Okori & Joseph Obua, Machine Learning Classification Technique for Famine 
Prediction, PROCEEDINGS OF THE WORLD CONGRESS ON ENGINEERING 2011(July 6–8, 2011), 
http://www.iaeng.org/publication/WCE2011/WCE2011_pp991-996.pdf.   
44
 See, e.g., Jameson Toole et al., Quantifying Crime Waves, PROCEEDINGS OF AAAI ARTIFICIAL 
INTELLIGENCE FOR DEVELOPMENT (AI-D'10), http://ai-d.org/pdfs/Toole.pdf (last visited December 2, 
2012). 
45
 See Massoud Moussavi & Noel McGinn, A Model for Quality of Schooling, PROCEEDINGS OF AAAI 
ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE FOR DEVELOPMENT (AI-D'10), 
http://www.aaai.org/ocs/index.php/SSS/SSS10/paper/view/1126/1351 (last visited December 2, 2012). 
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C. Smart Grid 
¶20  Big data use within the “smart grid”46 context also illustrates the benefits of 
sophisticated data analysis. The smart grid is designed to allow electricity service 
providers, users, and other third parties to monitor and control electricity use. Utilities 
view the smart grid as a way to precisely locate power outages or other problems, 
including cyber-attacks or natural disasters, so that technicians can be dispatched to 
mitigate problems.  
¶21  Consumers benefit from more choices on means, timing, and quantity of electricity 
they use.
47
 Pro-environment policymakers view the smart grid as key to providing better 
power quality and more efficient delivery of electricity to facilitate the move towards 
renewable energy. Other benefits, such as accurately predicting energy demands to 
optimize renewable sources, may be reaped by society at large. Not only will future 
renewable sources benefit from the use of smart grid data, but also the current energy 
infrastructure will as well, for example, by utility companies accurately determining 
when to use peak versus baseload power plants. 
D. Traffic Management 
¶22  An additional area for data-driven environmental innovation is traffic management 
and control. Governments around the world are establishing electronic toll pricing 
systems, which determine differentiated payments based on mobility and congestion 
charges.
48
 These systems apply varying prices to drivers based on their differing use of 
vehicles and roads.  
¶23  Urban planners benefit from the analysis of personal location data for decisions 
involving road and mass transit construction, mitigation of traffic congestion, and 
planning for high-density development.
49
 Such decisions can not only cut congestion but 
also control the emission of pollutants.
50
 At the same time, individual drivers benefit 
from smart routing based on real-time traffic information, including accident reports and 
information about scheduled roadwork and congested areas.  
¶24  Automotive telematics is another area of innovation. Vehicles equipped with 
navigation systems with embedded communication modules propose a range of 
telematics services to improve fuel-efficient driving and allow drivers to plan trips taking 





 The “smart grid” refers to the modernization of the current electrical grid to introduce a bi-directional 
flow of information and electricity.”  E.g., Information and Privacy Commissioner of Ontario & Future of 
Privacy Forum, SMART PRIVACY FOR THE SMART GRID: EMBEDDING PRIVACY INTO THE DESIGN OF 
ELECTRICITY CONSERVATION (Nov. 2009), http://www.ipc.on.ca/images/Resources/pbd-smartpriv-
smartgrid.pdf.  
47
 See, e.g, Katie Fehrenbacher, Introducing the Facebook Social Energy App, GIGAOM (Oct. 17, 2011, 
7:57 AM), http://gigaom.com/cleantech/introducing-the-facebook-social-energy-app.  
48
 See, e.g., Directive 2004/52/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on 
the Interoperability of Electronic Road Toll Systems in the Community, 2004 O.J. (L 166) 124, 125–27; see 
also Commission Decision 2009/750/EC of 6 October 2009 on the Definition of the European Electronic 
Toll Service and Its Technical Element, 2009 O.J. (L 268) 11, 11–14.  
49
 See, e.g., Carlo Ratti et al., Mobile Landscapes: Using Location Data from Cell-Phones for Urban 
Analysis, 33 ENV’T. AND PLAN. B: PLAN. AND DESIGN 727, 745 (2006).  
50
 MGI Report, supra note 23, at 92. 
51
 For various examples, see special issue Automotive Pervasive Computing, IEEE PERVASIVE COMP., 
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E. Retail 
¶25  Big data is also transforming the retail market. It was Wal-Mart’s inventory-
management system (“Retail Link”) which pioneered the age of big data by enabling 
suppliers to see the exact number of their products on every shelf of every store at each 
precise moment in time.
52
 Many shoppers use Amazon’s “Customers Who Bought This 
Also Bought” feature, prompting users to consider buying additional items selected by a 
collaborative filtering tool. The most prevalent business model for the Internet is based 
on financing products and services with targeted ads whose value correlates directly with 
the amount of information collected from users.
53
 Businesses care not so much about the 
identity of each individual user but rather on the attributes of her profile, which determine 
the nature of ads she is shown.
54
  
¶26  Analytics can also be used in the offline environment to study customers’ in-store 
behavior to improve store layout, product mix, and shelf positioning. A 2011 report by 
McKinsey & Company explains that “[r]ecent innovations have enabled retailers to track 
customers’ shopping patterns (e.g., foot traffic and time spent in different parts of a 
store), drawing real-time location data from smartphone applications (e.g., Shopkick), 
shopping cart transponders, or passively monitoring the location of mobile phones within 
a retail environment.”
55
 Increasingly, organizations are seeking to link online activity to 
offline behavior, both in order to assess the effectiveness of online ad campaigns, as 
judged by conversion to in-store purchases, and to re-target in-store customers with ads 
when they go online. 
F. Payments 
¶27  Another major arena for valuable big data use is fraud detection in the payment 
card industry. With electronic commerce capturing an increasingly large portion of the 
retail market, the merchants that bear ultimate responsibility for fraudulent card 
payments
56
 must implement robust mechanisms to identify suspect transactions often 
 
July-Sept. 2011, at 12. See also Sastry Duri et al., Data Protection and Data Sharing in Telematics, 9 
MOBILE NETWORKS & APPLICATIONS, 693, 695 (2004). 
52
 See, e.g., A Different Game: Information is Transforming Traditional Businesses, THE ECONOMIST, 
Feb. 25, 2010, http://www.economist.com/node/15557465.  
53
 See Article 29 Working Party, Opinion 2/2010 on Online Behavioral Advertising, at 5, WP 171 (June 
22, 2010), available at http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/fsj/privacy/docs/wpdocs/2010/wp171_en.pdf; see 
also, FTC STAFF REPORT, SELF-REGULATORY PRINCIPLES FOR ONLINE BEHAVIORAL ADVERTISING (2009), 
available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2009/02/P085400behavadreport.pdf.  
54
 See Omer Tene, For Privacy, European Commission Must Be Innovative, CDT BLOG (Feb. 28, 2011), 
https://www.cdt.org/blogs/privacy-european-commission-must-be-innovative (“[I]t is the singling out of an 
individual for unique treatment (e.g., the pricing of a loan or targeting of an ad) based on his or her profile, 
even without the ability to unmask his or her name, which has significant privacy implications.”); see 
generally, Omer Tene & Jules Polonetsky, To Track or 'Do Not Track': Advancing Transparency and 
Individual Control in Online Behavioral Advertising, 13 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 282 (2012).   
55
 MGI Report, supra note 23, at 68. 
56
 A set of laws and regulations serve to protect consumer users of credit and debit cards from bearing 
the consequences of fraud losses associated with lost or stolen cards. See Truth in Lending Act, Title I of 
the Consumer Credit Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1601; see also Regulation Z, 12 C.F.R. § 226, 
promulgated by the Federal Reserve Board pursuant to authority granted under 15 U.S.C. § 1607.  The 
Electronic Fund Transfer Act and Federal Reserve Board Regulation E place a floating cap on a consumer 
cardholder’s liability for unauthorized debit card use under which the maximum liability amount is 
determined when the cardholder notifies the card issuer of the loss or theft of the card used to perpetrate the 
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performed by first-time customers. To this end, some companies have developed 
solutions to provide merchants with predictive fraud scores for “Card-Not-Present 
transactions” in order to measure in real time the likelihood that a transaction is 
fraudulent.
57
 To do that, the services analyze buyer histories and provide evaluations, 
much like a summarized list of references but in the form of a single score. As fraudsters 
become more sophisticated in their approach, online merchants must remain ever more 
vigilant in their efforts to protect the integrity of the online shopping experience. 
G. Online 
¶28  Finally, perhaps the most oft-cited example of the potential of big data analytics 
lies within the massive data silos maintained by the online tech giants: Google, Facebook, 
Microsoft, Apple, and Amazon. These companies have amassed previously unimaginable 
amounts of personal data. Facebook, for example, has more than 900 million users who 
upload more than 250 millions photos and click the “Like” button more than 2.5 billion 
times per day.
58
 Google offers a plethora of data-intensive products and services, 
including its ubiquitous search engine, mobile operating system (Android), web browser 
(Chrome), email service (Gmail), video streaming site (YouTube), mapping service 
(Google Maps), social networking service (Google Plus), website analytics tool (Google 
Analytics), cloud platform service (Google Apps), and many others.
59
 In addition, Google 
owns the largest online advertising serving company, DoubleClick, which it purchased in 
2007, much to the consternation of privacy advocates,
60
 as well as AdMob, the leading 
mobile advertising company. As a result, Google now has a presence on well over 70 
percent of third party websites.
61
 Amazon and Yahoo are seeking new ways to leverage 
and monetize their treasure trove of customer data.
62
 Apple and Microsoft make 
 
fraud. If the cardholder notifies the card issuer within two business days of learning of the loss or theft of 
the debit card, the cardholder’s maximum liability is limited to the lesser of the actual amount of 
unauthorized transfers or $50.00. See Electronic Fund Transfer Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1693–1700; see also 
Federal Reserve Board Regulation E, 12 C.F.R. § 205.6(b)(1). Liability is further allocated between card 
issuers and merchants, generally shifting the risk away from the card issuers and onto the merchants, based 
on a complicated set of rules that vary based on the type of transaction at issue. See Duncan Douglass, An 
Examination of the Fraud Liability Shift in Consumer Card-Based Payment Systems, 33 ECONOMIC 
PERSPECTIVES 43, 45 (2009).    
57
 For various solution providers operating in this space, see Solution Provider Search, MERCHANT RISK 
COUNCIL, https://www.merchantriskcouncil.org/Resources/Pages/Solution-Provider-Search.aspx.   
58
 Melissa Fach, Stats on Facebook 2012, SEARCH ENGINE J. (Feb. 17, 2012), 
http://www.searchenginejournal.com/stats-on-facebook-2012-infographic/40301;  see also Margot Bonner, 
10 Key Statistics About Facebook, EXPERIAN HITWISE BLOG (Feb. 2, 2012), 
http://www.experian.com/blogs/hitwise/2012/2/2/10-key-statistics-about-facebook.  
59
 Google Products, GOOGLE, http://www.google.com/intl/en/about/products/index.html (last visited 
Dec. 2, 2012).   
60
 See FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, STATEMENT OF FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION CONCERNING 
GOOGLE/DOUBLECLICK, F.T.C. FILE NO. 071-0170, (Dec. 20, 2007), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0710170/071220statement.pdf; see also FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, 
DISSENTING STATEMENT OF COMM. PAMELA JONES HARBOUR, IN THE MATTER OF Google/DoubleClick, 
F.T.C. File No. 071-0170, (Dec. 20, 2007), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0710170/071220harbour.pdf.  
61
 See Public Comment from Balachander Krishnamurthy & Craig Wills, Privacy Diffusion on the Web: 
A Longitudinal Perspective, (Oct. 20, 2009) (in response to Federal Trade Commission Project No. 
P095416), http://www.ftc.gov/os/comments/privacyroundtable/544506-00009.pdf.  
62
 See Nicole Perlroth, BITS; Revamping at Yahoo to Focus on Its Media Properties and Customer 
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operating systems as well as browsers, both of which are important focal points for 
collecting online and mobile user information. 
II. BIG DATA: BIG CONCERNS 
¶29  Big data poses big privacy risks. The harvesting of large sets of personal data and 
the use of state of the art analytics implicate growing privacy concerns. Protecting 
privacy will become harder as information is multiplied and shared ever more widely 
among multiple parties around the world. As more information regarding individuals’ 
health, financials, location, electricity use, and online activity percolates, concerns arise 
regarding profiling, tracking, discrimination, exclusion, government surveillance, and 
loss of control.
63
 This Part lays out some of the unique privacy risks presented by big 
data. 
A. Incremental Effect 
¶30  The accumulation of personal data has an incremental adverse effect on privacy.64 
A researcher will draw entirely different conclusions from a string of online search 
queries consisting of the words “paris,” “hilton” and “louvre” as compared to one 
featuring “paris,” “hilton” and “nicky.” Add thousands and thousands of search queries, 
and you can immediately sense how the data become ever more revealing.
65
 Moreover, 
once data—such as a clickstream or a cookie number—are linked to an identified 
individual, they become difficult to disentangle.
66
 This was demonstrated by University 
of Texas researchers Arvind Narayanan and Vitaly Shmatikov, who re-associated de-
identified Netflix movie recommendations with identified individuals by crossing a de-
identified database with publicly available resources accessible online.
67
 Narayanan and 
Shmatikov explained, “Once any piece of data has been linked to a person’s real identity, 
any association between this data and a virtual identity breaks anonymity of the latter.”
68
 
Paul Ohm warned that this incremental effect will lead to a “database of ruin,” chewing 
 




 See Daniel Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 477 (2006) (for a taxonomy of privacy 
harms).  
64
 Solove in his “taxonomy” calls this “aggregation.” Id. at 505–09 
65
 See, e.g., Michael Barbaro & Tom Zeller, A Face Is Exposed for AOL Searcher No. 4417749, N.Y. 
TIMES, Aug. 9, 2006, http://www.nytimes.com/2006/08/09/technology/09aol.html?pagewanted=all. 
66
 See Myspace LLC, F.T.C. File No. 102-3058, Agreement Containing Consent Order (May 8, 2012), 
http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/1023058/120508myspaceorder.pdf (charging that Myspace “constructively 
shared” personally identifiable information with third party advertisers by sharing with such advertisers a 
unique identifier assigned to the profile of each Myspace user (a “Friend ID”), which could then be used to 
access such user’s profile information – a practice referred to in the industry as “cookie syncing.”). See also 
Myspace, LLC: Analysis of Proposed Consent Order To Aid Public Comment, 77 Fed. Reg. 28,388 
(Federal Trade Commission May 14, 2012), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2012-05-
14/pdf/2012-11613.pdf. For an analysis of “cookie syncing,” see Ed Felten, Syncing and the FTC’s 
Myspace Settlement, TECH@FTC (May 8, 2012), http://techatftc.wordpress.com/2012/05/08/syncing-and-
the-ftcs-myspace-settlement.   
67
 Arvind Narayanan & Vitaly Shmatikov, Robust De-anonymization of Large Sparse Datasets, 2008 
IEEE SYMP. ON SECURITY & PRIVACY 111. 
68
 Id. at 119. 
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¶31  More generally, the ephemeral nature of personal data makes it difficult to 
recapture after it is exposed in the public or semi-public sphere.
70
 For this reason, the 
European Commission’s proposal of a “right to be forgotten,” which would allow 
individuals to demand organizations to wipe their data slate clean,
71
 has been met with 
fierce resistance from online platforms
72
 and free speech advocates,
73
 who are concerned 
about the effect of the proposal on the delicate balance between privacy and regulation of 
the Internet. 
B. Automated Decision-Making 
¶32  The relegation of decisions about an individual’s life to automated processes based 
on algorithms and artificial intelligence raises concerns about discrimination, self-
determination, and the narrowing of choice.
74
 This is true not only for decisions relating 
to an individual’s credit, insurance, or job prospects,
75
 but also for highly customized 
choices regarding which advertisements or content a user will see.
76
 In his book The 
Daily You: How the New Advertising Industry Is Defining Your Identity and Your Worth, 
Joseph Turow argues that increased personalization based on opaque corporate profiling 
algorithms poses a risk to open society and democratic speech.
77
 He explains that by 
“pigeonholing” individuals into pre-determined categories, automated decision-making 
compartmentalizes society into pockets (or “echo chambers”) of like-minded 
individuals.
78
 Turow argues government should regulate information intermediaries to 
ensure that users have full control over their data and content consumption. 
 
69
 Paul Ohm, Broken Promises of Privacy: Responding to the Surprising Failure of Anonymization, 57 
UCLA L. REV. 1701, 1748 (2010). 
70
 A social networking service (SNS) is a semi-public sphere. While an individual user’s postings are 
made according to the SNS privacy settings, other users are not subject to a legal obligation to comply with 
such user’s individual settings. Consequently, a posting made by a user and restricted to her “friends” may 
later be disseminated broadly by those friends so as to become public or semi-public. See Omer Tene, Me, 
Myself and I: Aggregated and Disaggregated Identities on Social Networking Services, J. INT'L COMM. L. 
& TECH. (forthcoming 2012). 
71
 Council Directive 95/46, art. 17, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 35 (EC); see also Viviane Reding, Vice President, 
Eur. Comm’n, EU Data Protection Reform 2012: Making Europe the Standard Setter for Modern Data 
Protection Rules in the Digital Age 5, Speech at the Digital-Life-Design Conference (Jan. 22, 2012), 
available at Press Release Europa, http:// http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-12-26_en.htm, 
(last visited April 2, 2013). 
72
 See Peter Fleischer, Foggy Thinking About the Right to Oblivion, PRIVACY...? BLOG (Mar. 9, 2011), 
http://peterfleischer.blogspot.com/2011/03/foggy-thinking-about-right-to-oblivion.html.  
73
 See Jeffrey Rosen, The Right to Be Forgotten, 64 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 88 (2012).  
74
 See Ruth Gavison, Privacy, 89 YALE L.J. 421 (1980); Council Directive 95/46, art. 15, 1995 O.J. (L 
281) 43 (EC).  
75
 Such decisions have for many years been regulated by laws such as the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 
15 U.S.C. § 1681(a)–(b). 
76
 Kashmir Hill, Resisting The Algorithms, FORBES, May 5, 2011, 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/kashmirhill/2011/05/05/resisting-the-algorithms.  
77
 JOSEPH TUROW, THE DAILY YOU: HOW THE NEW ADVERTISING INDUSTRY IS DEFINING YOUR 
IDENTITY AND YOUR WORTH (2011). For similar arguments, see ELI PARISER, THE FILTER BUBBLE: WHAT 
THE INTERNET IS HIDING FROM YOU (2011).  
78
 This phenomenon is sometimes referred to as “cyberbalkanization.” See Cyberbalkanization, 
WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cyberbalkanization; see also ANDREW SHAPIRO, THE CONTROL 
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C. Predictive Analysis 
¶33  Big data may facilitate predictive analysis with stark implications for individuals 
susceptible to disease, crime, or other socially stigmatizing characteristics or behaviors. 
To be sure, predictive analysis can be used for societally beneficial goals, such as 
planning disaster recovery in an earthquake prone area based on individuals’ evacuation 
paths and purchase needs. Yet it can easily cross the “creepiness” threshold.
79
  
¶34  Consider a recent story in the New York Times, which uncovered that the retailing 
giant, Target Inc., assigns a “pregnancy prediction score” to customers based on their 
purchase habits.
80
 According to the Times, Target employed statisticians to sift back 
through historical buying records of women who had signed up for baby registries. The 
statisticians discovered latent patterns, such as women’s preference for unscented lotion 
around the beginning of their second trimester or a tendency to buy supplements like 
calcium, magnesium and zinc within the first 20 weeks of a pregnancy. They were able to 
determine a set of products that, when grouped together, allowed Target to accurately 
predict a customer’s pregnancy and due date. In one case, the Times reported that a father 
of a teenage girl stormed into a Target store to complain that his daughter received 
coupons and advertisements for baby products. A few days later, he called the store 
manager to apologize, admitting that, “There’s been some activities in my house I 
haven’t been completely aware of. She’s due in August.”
81
  
¶35  Predictive analysis is useful for law enforcement, national security, credit 
screening, insurance, and employment. It raises ethical dilemmas illustrated, for example, 
in the film Minority Report, where a “PreCrime” police department apprehends 
“criminals” based on foreknowledge of their future misdeeds. It could facilitate unlawful 
activity such as “redlining.”
82
 Although these practices are illegal under current laws, 
critics expressed concerns that data are surreptitiously being used in such a manner.
83
 
¶36  Predictive analysis is particularly problematic when based on sensitive categories 
of data, such as health, race, or sexuality. It is one thing to recommend for a customer 
books, music or movies she might be interested in based on her previous purchases;
84
 it is 
 
REVOLUTION: HOW THE INTERNET IS PUTTING INDIVIDUALS IN CHARGE AND CHANGING THE WORLD WE 
KNOW (PublicAffairs, 2000).  
79
 See, e.g., danah boyd, Senior Researcher, Microsoft Research, Speech at the DataEDGE Conference 
2012 (cited in Quentin Hardy, Rethinking Privacy in an Era of Big Data, N.Y. TIMES, June 4, 2012, 
http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/06/04/rethinking-privacy-in-an-era-of-big-data) (stating that “privacy is 
a source of tremendous tension and anxiety in Big Data. It’s a general anxiety that you can’t pinpoint, this 
odd moment of creepiness.”).  
80





 Redlining refers to the act of denying or increasing the cost of services such as loans, insurance, or 
healthcare to residents of neighborhoods comprised mostly of minorities. The term was coined to reflect the 
practice of some lenders of drawing red lines on maps to delineate neighborhoods where they would not 
lend money. See THE URBAN INSTITUTE, MORTGAGE LENDING DISCRIMINATION: A REVIEW OF EXISTING 
EVIDENCE (Margery Turner & Felicity Skidmore, Eds., 1999). 
83
 See, e.g., Letter from Center for Digital Democracy, U.S. PIRG & World Privacy Forum, to the 
Federal Trade Commission,  In the Matter of Real-time Targeting and Auctioning, Data Profiling 
Optimization, and Economic Loss to Consumers and Privacy (Apr. 8, 2010), available at 
http://www.centerfordigitaldemocracy.org/sites/default/files/20100407-FTCfiling.pdf.  
84
 Consider Amazon, Netflix and Pandora recommendation systems. See Gediminas Adomavicius & 
Alexander Tuzhilin, Towards the Next Generation of Recommender Systems: A Survey of the State-of-the-
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quite another thing to identify when she is pregnant before her closest family knows. In 
the law enforcement arena, predictive analysis raises the specter of surveying or even 
incarcerating individuals based on thoughts as opposed to deeds.
85
 This type of activity, 
while clearly unconstitutional under existing U.S. law, is not so far-fetched in other parts 
of the world,
86
 and could conceivably cross the line from fiction to reality, given the right 
circumstances in the United States.
87
   
¶37  Even with non-sensitive data categories, predictive analysis may have a stifling 
effect on individuals and society, perpetuating old prejudices. The wealthy and well-
educated will get the fast track; the poor and underprivileged will have the deck stacked 
against them even more so than before.
88
 By ignoring outliers and assuming that “what 
has been is what will be,”
89
 predictive analysis becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy that 
accentuates social stratification.
90
 Predictive analysis leads to morally contentious 
conclusions, such as those drawn by the (in)famous 2001 article of John Donohue and 
Steven Levitt, The Impact of Legalized Abortion on Crime, which argued that the 
legalization of abortion in the 1970s contributed significantly to reductions in crime rates 
experienced in the 1990s.
91
 
D. Lack of Access and Exclusion 
¶38  An additional concern raised by big data is that it tilts an already uneven scale in 
favor of organizations and against individuals. The big benefits of big data, the argument 
goes, accrue to government and big business, not to individuals—and they often come at 
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85
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individuals’ expense. In the words of the adage, “if you're not paying for it, you're not the 
customer; you're the product.”
92
  
¶39  The exclusion of individuals from the benefits of the use of their data manifests in 
two main ways. First, online interactions are barter-like transactions where individuals 
exchange personal data for free services.
93
 Yet those transactions appear to take place in 
an inefficient market hampered by steep information asymmetries, which are further 
aggravated by big data. Transacting with a big data platform is like a game of poker 
where one of the players has his hand open and the other keeps his cards close. The 
online company knows the preferences of the transacting individual inside and out, 
perhaps better than the individual knows him or herself. It can therefore usurp the entire 
value surplus available in the transaction by pricing goods or services as close as possible 
to the individual’s reservation price.  
¶40  Second, organizations are seldom prepared to share the wealth created by 
individuals’ personal data with those individuals. In the Guardian, Sir Tim Berners-Lee 
recently remarked: 
“My computer has a great understanding of my state of fitness, of the things I'm 
eating, of the places I'm at. My phone understands from being in my pocket how 
much exercise I've been getting and how many stairs I've been walking up and so 
on.” Exploiting such data could provide hugely useful services to individuals, he 
said, but only if their computers had access to personal data held about them by 
web companies. “One of the issues of social networking silos is that they have 
the data and I don't.”
94
 
¶41  The right of access granted to individuals under the European Data Protection 
Directive
95
 and additional fair information principles has been implemented narrowly. 




 This phrase, which has become a staple in online culture, is attributed to a discussion on a MetaFilter 
community in August 2010. See Jonathan Zittrain, Meme patrol: “When Something Online is Free, You’re 
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E. The Ethics of Analytics: Drawing the Line 
¶42  Like any other type of research, data analytics can cross the threshold of unethical 
behavior. Consider the recent research by a Texas University developmental psychology 
professor, who logged and reviewed every text message, email, photo, and instant 
message sent by a group of 175 teenagers on Blackberries that she provided to them.
96
 
The participants and their parents were required to sign consent forms; yet, regardless of 
consent form legalese, it is doubtful that the minors could fully assess the implications of 
the omniscient surveillance.
97
 Like children’s data, other categories of sensitive data may 
be collected and analyzed for ethically dubious research. Consider a service analyzing 
individuals’ preferences on pornography sites for use in behavioral advertising.
98
 More 
complicated yet, the analysis of apparently innocuous data may create new sensitive facts 
about an individual, as occurred in the instance of Target’s “pregnancy score,”
99
 or which 
may be possible with a prediction of the onset of Alzheimer’s disease. Where should the 
red line be drawn when it comes to big data analysis? Moreover, who should benefit from 
access to big data? Could ethical scientific research be conducted without disclosing to 
the general public the data used to reach the results? 
F. Chilling Effect 
¶43  As recently observed by Jay Stanley of the ACLU, “as the ramifications of big data 
analytics sink in, people will likely become much more conscious of the ways they’re 
being tracked, and the chilling effects on all sorts of behaviors could become 
considerable.”
100
  The result is what the former UK privacy regulator dubbed “a 
surveillance society,” a psychologically oppressive world in which individuals are cowed 
to conforming behavior by the state’s potential panoptic gaze.
101
 
III. THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK: CHALLENGES 
¶44  How does the existing privacy framework deal with the big data phenomenon?  
This part reviews the FIPPs strained by the current technological and business landscape 
(including the definition of PII), the principles of data minimization and purpose 
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limitation, and the concept of consent.
102
  This part also argues that, inevitably, these 
elements of the privacy framework should adjust to reflect existing technological and 
organizational realities, which include ubiquitous data collection and individuals who are 
ill-placed to meaningfully review privacy policies.  Together with the next part, it argues 
that the FIPPs should be used as a set of levers, which can be modulated to address big 
data by relaxing the principles of data minimization and individual control while 
tightening requirements for transparency, access, and accuracy. 
A. Definition of PII 
¶45  Traditionally, de-identification was viewed as a silver bullet allowing organizations 
to reap the benefits of analytics while preserving individuals’ privacy.
103
  Organizations 
used various methods of de-identification (anonymization, pseudonymization, encryption, 
key-coding, data sharing) to distance data from personal identities.
104
  Yet, over the past 
few years, computer scientists have repeatedly shown that even anonymized data can 
typically be re-identified and associated with specific individuals.
105
  De-identified data, 
in other words, is a temporary state rather than a stable category.
106
  In an influential law 
review article, Paul Ohm observed that “[r]e-identification science disrupts the privacy 
policy landscape by undermining the faith that we have placed in anonymization.”
107
  The 
implications for government and businesses can be stark, because de-identification has 
become a key component of numerous business models, most notably in the context of 
health data (e.g., clinical trials), online behavioral advertising, and cloud computing.  
¶46  The first major policy question raised by the big data phenomenon concerns the 
scope of information subject to privacy law.  How robust must de-identification be in 
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order to “liberate” data from the throes of privacy legislation?  One possible conclusion, 
apparently supported by Ohm himself, is that all data should be treated as PII and 
subjected to the regulatory framework.
108
  Yet, such a result would create perverse 
incentives for organizations to forgo de-identification altogether and therefore increase, 
not alleviate, privacy and data security risks.
109
  A further pitfall is that with a vastly 
expanded definition of PII, the privacy framework would become all but unworkable.  
Difficult enough to comply with and enforce today, the current framework may well be 
unmanageable if it extends to every piece of information.
110
  Moreover, while 
anonymized information always carries some risk of re-identification, many of the most 
pressing privacy risks exist only if there is reasonable likelihood of re-identification.  As 
uncertainty is introduced into the re-identification equation, we cannot know whether the 
information truly corresponds to a particular individual, and the dataset becomes more 
anonymous as larger amounts of uncertainty are introduced.
111
  
¶47  More importantly, many beneficial uses of data would be severely curtailed if 
information, ostensibly not about individuals, comes under full remit of privacy laws 
based on a remote possibility of being linked to an individual at some point in time 
through some conceivable method, no matter how unlikely to be used.
112
  Such an 
approach presumes a value judgment has been made in favor of individual control over 
highly beneficial uses of data, such as Dr. Altman’s discovery of the Paxil-Pravachol side 
effect; yet, it is doubtful that such a value choice has consciously been made.  
¶48  PII should instead be defined based on a risk matrix taking into account the risk, 
intent, and potential consequences of re-identification, as opposed to a dichotomy 
between “identifiable” and “non-identifiable” data.
113
  A bi-polar approach based on 
labeling information either “personally identifiable” or not, is unhelpful and inevitably 
leads to an inefficient arms race between de-identifiers and re-identifiers.  In this process, 
the integrity, accuracy, and value of the data may be degraded or lost, together with some 
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¶49  A better solution would be, first, to view the identifiability of data as a continuum 
as opposed to the current dichotomy.
115
  This means adopting a scaled approach, under 
which data that are only identifiable at great cost would remain within the legal 
framework, subject to only a subset of fair information principles.
116
  Second, the 
approach that should be adopted is the one proposed by the Federal Trade Commission 
(FTC) in its recent report Protecting Consumer Privacy in an Era of Rapid Change,
117
 
which overlays the statistical probability of re-identifiablity with legally enforceable 
organizational commitments as well as downstream contractual obligations not to re-
identify or to attempt to re-identify.  According to the FTC, “as long as (1) a given data 
set is not reasonably identifiable, (2) the company publicly commits not to re-identify it, 
and (3) the company requires any downstream users of the data to keep it in de-identified 
form, that data will fall outside the scope of the framework.”
118
  Recognizing that it is 
virtually impossible to guarantee privacy by scrutinizing the data alone, without defining 
and analyzing its intended uses, the FTC shifts the crux of the inquiry from a factual test 
of identifiablilty to a legal examination of an organization’s intent and commitment to 
prevent re-identification.  
¶50  Finally, we advocate viewing de-identification as an important protective measure 
to be taken under the data security and accountability principles, rather than a solution to 
the big data conundrum.
119
  Organizations collecting and harvesting big data would be 
wise to de-identify data to the extent possible while not compromising their beneficial 
use.  At the same time, the privacy framework will continue to partially apply to de-
identified data because researchers have the ability to re-link almost any piece of data to 
an individual, if provided appropriate incentive to do so. 
B. Data Minimization 
¶51  Through various iterations and formulations, data minimization has remained a 
fundamental principle of privacy law.
120
  Organizations are required to limit the 
collection of personal data to the minimum extent necessary to obtain their legitimate 
goals.  Moreover, they are required to delete data that is no longer used for the purposes 
for which they were collected and to implement restrictive policies with respect to the 
retention of personal data in identifiable form.  The big data business model is antithetical 
to data minimization.  It incentivizes collection of more data for longer periods of time.  
It is aimed precisely at those unanticipated secondary uses, the “crown jewels” of big 
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data.  After all, who could have anticipated that Bing search queries would be used to 
unearth harmful drug interactions?
121
 
¶52  Here too, legal rules collide with technological and business realities. 
Organizations today collect and retain personal data through multiple channels including 
the Internet, mobile, biological and industrial sensors, video, e-mail, and social 
networking tools.  Modern organizations amass data collected directly from individuals 
or third parties, and they harvest private, semi-public (e.g., Facebook), or public (e.g., the 
electoral roll) sources.  Data minimization is simply no longer the market norm.  
¶53  In considering the fate of data minimization, the principles of privacy law must be 
balanced against additional societal values such as public health, national security and 
law enforcement, environmental protection, and economic efficiency.  A coherent 
framework should be based on a risk matrix that weighs the value of data against 
potential privacy risks.  Where prospective data uses are highly beneficial and privacy 
risks minimal, the legitimacy of processing should be assumed even if individuals decline 
(or are not asked) to consent.  For example, web analytics—the measurement, collection, 
analysis, and reporting of internet data for purposes of understanding and optimizing web 
usage—creates great value by ensuring that products and services can be improved to 
better serve consumers.  Privacy risks are minimal because analytics, if properly 
implemented, deals with statistical data, typically in de-identified form.
122
  Yet requiring 
online users to opt into analytics would no doubt severely limit its application and use. 
¶54  This is not to suggest, of course, that data should be collected exclusively in 
instances where it may become useful or that data collected for one purpose may be re-
purposed at will.  Rather, in a big data world, the principle of data minimization should 
be interpreted differently, requiring organizations to de-identify data when possible, 
implement reasonable security measures, and limit uses of data to those that are 
acceptable from not only an individual but also a societal perspective. 
C. Individual Control and Context 
¶55  Legal frameworks all over the world continue to emphasize consent, or individual 
control, as a fundamental principle of privacy law.  In the United States, “notice and 
choice” has been the central axis of privacy regulation for more than a decade.
123
  In the 
European Union, consent remains the most commonly used basis to legitimize data 
processing under Article 7 of the Data Protection Directive.
124
  By emphasizing consent, 
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existing privacy frameworks impose significant, sometimes unrealistic, obligations on 
both organizations and individuals.  On the one hand, organizations are expected to 
explain their data processing activities on increasingly small screens and obtain consent 
from often-uninterested individuals; on the other hand, individuals are expected to read 
and understand complicated privacy disclosures and express their “informed” consent.
125
  
This takes place against an increasingly complex backdrop in which data flows are 
handled through intricate arrangements involving dense networks of platforms and 
applications, including contractors, subcontractors, and service providers operating 
globally.  Moreover, to be meaningful, consent must be specific to the purpose (or 
context).  Yet by its very nature, big data analysis seeks surprising correlations and 
produces results that resist prediction.  
¶56  The consent model is flawed from an economic perspective.  Information 
asymmetries and well-documented cognitive biases cast a shadow on the authenticity of 
individuals’ privacy choices.  For example, Alessandro Acquisti and his colleagues have 
shown that simply by providing users a feeling of control, businesses can encourage the 
sharing of data regardless of whether or not users actually gained control.
126
  Joseph 
Turow and others have shown that “[w]hen consumers see the term ‘privacy policy,’ they 
believe that their personal information will be protected in specific ways; in particular, 
they assume that a website that advertises a privacy policy will not share their personal 
information.”
127
  In reality, however, this is not the case. It is common knowledge among 
practitioners in the field that privacy policies serve more as liability disclaimers for 
businesses than as assurances of privacy for consumers. 
¶57  At the same time, collective action problems threaten to generate a suboptimal 
equilibrium where individuals fail to opt into societally beneficial data processing in the 
hope of free-riding on others’ good will.  Consider, for example, Internet browser crash 
reports, which very few users opt into; even when they do make such an election, they are 
often motivated less by real privacy concerns than by a (misplaced) belief that others will 
do the job for them.  As is often the case in public opinion polling, the precise wording of 
choice menus presented to individuals has a disproportionate effect on their decisions to 
opt in or out of such polling.  It seems likely that if prompted, most search engine users 
would decline the search engine permission to analyze their search logs for the detection 
of harmful drug interactions.  Yet, when asked in retrospect about the actions of Dr. 
Altman and his team, the same users may find them commendable.  
¶58  Similar free-riding is common in other contexts where the difference between opt-
in and opt-out regimes is stark.  This is the case, for example, with organ donation rates.  
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In countries where citizens must opt in for organ donation, donation rates tend to be very 
low compared to countries that are culturally similar but have an opt-out regime.  This 
concept is illustrated by the comparative donation rates in Sweden (85.9% under an opt-
out regime) versus Denmark (4.25% under an opt-in regime), and in Austria (99.9% 
under an opt-out regime) versus Germany (12% under an opt-in regime).
128
  
¶59  An additional problem is that consent-based processing tends to be regressive 
because individuals’ expectations fall back on existing experiences.  For example, if 
Facebook had not proactively launched its News Feed feature in 2006 and had instead 
waited for users to opt in,
129
 users might not have enjoyed Facebook as it is known today.  
It is only when data started flowing that users became accustomed to the change.  
Similarly, few individuals would have agreed had Google solicited consent (or regulatory 
approval) for “wardriving”
130
 through cities all over the world to create a comprehensive 
map of Wi-Fi networks for its geo-location services.
131
  Yet in retrospect, after Google 
provided users an opportunity to opt out their routers, it is doubtful that many users have 
actually done so.
132
  The decisions by regulators in this case indicate some appreciation 
for the value of Google’s data use, even if this rationale was not clearly expressed.    
¶60  This article does not argue that individuals should never be asked to expressly 
consent to the use of their information or offered an option to opt out.  Rather, it suggests 
that the merits of a given data use should be debated as a broader societal issue.  Does 
society believe that direct marketing, behavioral advertising, third-party data brokering, 
and location-based services are legitimate (or even commendable) models that are worth 
pursuing or excessive intrusions that should be deterred?  When making decisions about 
the need for individuals’ consent and how it should be obtained, policymakers should 
recognize that default rules often prevail and determine the existence of these data uses.  
Too often, debates about whether consent should be solicited or opt-out choice provided 
focus solely on the mechanics of expressing consent.
133
  But heightened focus on consent 
and data minimization, with little appreciation for the value of data use, could jeopardize 
innovation and beneficial societal advances.  
¶61  The legitimacy of data use had always intended to take additional values into 
account beyond privacy.  For example, law enforcement has traditionally been allotted a 
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degree of freedom to override privacy restrictions in appropriate cases with the 
satisfaction of due process requirements.
134
  Consequently, the role of consent should be 
demarcated according to normative choices made by policymakers with respect to 
prospective data uses.  In some cases, consent should not be required, while in others, 
consent should be assumed subject to a right of refusal.  In specific cases, consent should 
be required to legitimize data use. 
IV. THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK: SOLUTIONS 
¶62  This part argues that while relaxing the principles of data minimization and 
consent, the current privacy framework should stress access and transparency. It explores 
how individuals can be empowered with enhanced transparency and access rights, 
thereby rebalancing the framework and creating additional opportunity for efficient value 
creation and innovation. It argues that if individuals were provided access to their 
information in machine-readable (heretofore, “usable”) format, the personal information 
ecosystem would expand; layers upon layers of user-side applications are likely to 
emerge to harvest information to benefit not only organizations, but also individuals. This 
part further suggests that, subject to the protection of trade secrets, organizations should 
be required to reveal the criteria used in their decision-making processes with respect to 
personal data analysis. Such a requirement will likely discourage unethical, if not illegal, 
classifications and provide individuals with the due process opportunity to challenge 
decisions made about them by algorithm-driven machines. 
A. Access, Portability, and Sharing the Wealth 
¶63  The right to access and rectify one’s individual information—while one of the 
fundamental principles of information privacy—remains woefully underutilized.
135
 Few 
individuals are aware of their access rights and even fewer exercise them.
136
 And why 
should they? Access rights are neither convenient nor particularly useful. Organizations 
typically provide access to data only in “hardcopy,” after weeks or months of delays 
arising from correspondence and requests for authentication and payment of fees.  
Organizations often fail to provide details about sources, uses, and recipients of the 
information they collect, and seek to rely on a panoply of legal exemptions to mask 
portions of the data that they do disclose. The increasing complexity of the data 
ecosystem renders it difficult for individuals to determine to whom an access request 
should be sent.  Furthermore, processors or sub-processors of data are often based in 
foreign jurisdictions, without a consumer-facing interface to handle individual requests. 
Indeed, one user’s quest to obtain his personal information from Facebook was so novel 
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135
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¶64  As a quid pro quo for looser data collection and minimization restrictions, 
organizations should be prepared to share the wealth created by individuals’ data with 
those individuals. This means providing individuals with access to their data in a “usable” 
format and allowing them to take advantage of third party applications to analyze their 
own data and draw useful conclusions (e.g., consume less protein, go on a skiing 
vacation, invest in bonds). 
¶65  This “featurization” of big data will unleash innovation and create a market for 
personal data applications.
138
 The technological groundwork has already been completed 
with mash-ups and real-time application programming interfaces (APIs),
139
 making it 
easier for organizations to combine information from different sources and services into a 
single user experience. Much like open-source software or Creative Commons licenses, 
free access to personal data is grounded in both efficiency and fairness rationales. 
Regardless of whether or not you accept a property approach to personal information,
140
 
fairness dictates that individuals enjoy beneficial use of their data.  
¶66  The roll out of the smart grid illustrates this point. Electric utilities reap most of the 
benefits associated with upgrading the electric grid to provide bi-directional 
communications. This explains why the smart grid was met by pushback from consumers 
and regulators who are concerned with its implications for privacy, data security, start-up 
costs, and dynamic pricing. Had consumers felt the beneficial impact of the smart grid 
themselves, they may have reacted differently. That is precisely the idea behind the 
Obama Administration’s “Green Button” initiative: the initiative establishes that 
consumers should have access to their own energy usage information in a downloadable, 
standard, easy-to-use electronic format.
141
 In a speech on September 15, 2011, Aneesh 
Chopra, the U.S. Chief Technology Officer, challenged the industry to “publish 
information online in an open format (machine-readable) without restrictions that would 
impede re-use.”
142
 In January 2012, three major California utilities announced their 
implementation of the Green Button,
143
 and a dozen more utilities followed suit in the 
first quarter of 2012.
144
 
¶67  The Administration predicted that making user data available to the public would 
lead entrepreneurs to develop technologies like energy management systems and 
smartphone applications that can interpret and use such information.
145




 Such a market is already picking up. See, e.g., Francesca Robin, The Emerging Market that Could 
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turn, would seek out applications that enable them to gain greater control over their 
energy use. Chopra emphasized the importance of providing the data in a standard format 
according to industry-accepted guidelines. A standard, usable format fosters innovation 
by allowing software developers to create a single version of their product that will work 
for all utility customers across the country. One developer told the New York Times that 
his company had “created a set of software development tools that had already attracted 
150 app developers. His company also plans to set up an online marketplace, similar to 




¶68  Accessing information about energy consumption for cost savings and novel usage 
is not solely the domain of utilities. For example, the Nest Learning Thermostat, 
developed by Nest Labs, is an energy conserving, self-programming, slickly designed 
home thermostat. It is also Wi-Fi connected to allow users to adjust their home or office 
temperature via an iPhone or Android app from anywhere they happen to be.
147
 Like the 
Green Button, the Nest Learning Thermostat lets users tap into their own data trail, which 
includes their movements about the house and information about their daily routine. 
Major communications providers such as AT&T, Verizon, and Comcast have also 




¶69  The concept of the “Green Button” follows a path charted by a similar initiative in 
the field of health data. In 2010, the Obama Administration announced the “Blue 
Button,” a web-based feature through which patients can easily download their health 
information in usable format and share it with health care providers and trusted third 
parties. To make the information more useful, the initiative challenged developers to 
create applications that build on the Blue Button by helping consumers use their data to 
manage their own health. In turn, applications such as the Blue Button Health Assistant, 
developed by Adobe, sprung up to facilitate linkage of patient information, including 
immunizations, allergies, medications, family health history, lab test results, and more.
149
 
¶70  An additional government program based on a similar mind-set is the “Data.gov” 
initiative. Government has long been the biggest generator, collector, and user of data 
(not necessarily PII), keeping records on every birth, marriage, and death, compiling 
figures on all aspects of the economy, and maintaining statistics on licenses, laws, and the 
weather. Until recently, all of the data was locked and hard to locate, even if publicly 
accessible.
150
 In many countries, a freedom of information request to obtain information 
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about the budgetary process, for example, would yield, at best, a voluminous PDF 
document locked for editing and difficult to explore. The Obama Administration, led by 
United States Chief Information Officer Vivek Kundra, embraced this innovation by 
launching “Data.gov.” The stated purpose of the new website was “to increase public 
access to high value, machine-readable datasets generated by the Executive Branch of the 
Federal Government.”
151
 The opening of the government’s data coffers unleashed a wave 
of innovation and helped create new economic value, as individuals and businesses used 
raw data to improve existing services and offer new solutions.
152
      
¶71  Increased use by individuals of their own data is also evident in the private sector. 
Various existing business models seek to arbitrate between users and organizations in 
order to tilt the scale back in favor of individuals. The Harvard Berkman Center’s 
“ProjectVRM” (“VRM” stands for “vendor relationship management”), which set an 
admittedly “immodest ambition of turning business on its head,” seeks to “provide 
customers with tools that provide both independence from vendor lock-in and better ways 
of engaging with vendors—on terms and by means that work better for both sides.”
153
 In 
his 2012 book, The Intention Economy, ProjectVRM’s leader Doc Searls posits a vision 
of a world where an individual is in complete control of her digital persona and grants 
permissions for vendors to access it on her own terms. In this world, individuals would 




¶72  Personal.com, for example, is a start up company that enables individuals to own, 
control access to, and benefit from their personal information.
155
 It does so by providing 
individuals with an online “data vault” divided into compartments called “gems,” where 
they can store and share information about their shopping habits, travel, log-in credentials 
on various sites, location information, and more.
156
 There are currently more than 100 
gems with more than 3,000 fields of data. The food preferences gem, for example, 
includes allergies, religious and dietary restrictions, and whether a user likes spicy food. 
Users can share gems with family, friends, employees or colleagues, and more 
importantly, monetize their own data by selling access to gems to commercial entities. 
(Personal.com collects a ten percent fee on such sales.) The company’s founders hope 
that Personal.com will become more than just a data vault, but rather a platform allowing 
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¶73  Another example is Intuit’s use of data gleaned from its Quickbooks and Turbotax 
products, which are used by millions of small businesses and individuals for accounting 
and tax filings. One new feature added to Quickbooks in 2012 is Easy Saver, which looks 
for items small business owners purchased frequently and then finds a better price for 
such items using negotiated high-volume discounts. Users will not see an offer for an 
item unless they have already bought it and are likely (based on previous purchasing 
behavior) to need it again soon. “The Trends feature in Quickbooks . . . tells business 
owners how their key indicators such as sales, operating margin and payroll costs 
compare with similar small businesses in their area or in the U.S. overall.”
158
  
¶74  If users fail to exercise their access and rectification rights, why should we expect 
them to actively engage with their data?  The answer is that they are already doing so 
through a plethora of Apple, Android, and Facebook applications.
159
  The entire “app 
economy” is premised on individuals accessing their own data for novel uses, ranging 
from GPS programs and restaurant recommendations to self-tailored financial and health 
services.
160
 Applications have become an integral aspect of how users experience social 
networks and the mobile Internet. They enable individuals to make innovative use of their 
list of friends on Facebook, address books, Wi-Fi router locations, and many other 
sources of data. A recent study found that the app economy has created 466,000 jobs in 
the United States since 2007.
161
 According to Facebook’s S-1 filing ahead of its IPO, 
Zynga, an app developer, is responsible for 12% of Facebook’s revenue estimated at 
more than $4 billion.
162
  
¶75  This article suggests the development of apps for the big data silos of the many 
companies who have focused on the collection and analysis of personal data for their own 
use.
163
 Recent market initiatives demonstrate the feasibility of business models based on 
empowering individual users.
164
 What the government seeks to achieve with its Green 
Button and Blue Button initiatives can and should be replicated in the private sector.  
¶76  The call for additional access and transparency echoes one of the fundamental 
rationales for information privacy law—the prevention of secret databases. From its 
inception, information privacy law has been modeled to alleviate this concern, which 
arose in the Watergate period in the United States and the Communist era in Eastern 
Europe when secret databases were used to curtail individual freedoms.
165
 Yet the 
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frameworks that emerged in response to such concerns, providing access rights in the 
United States and requiring database registration in the European Union, failed to engage 
individuals who remained largely oblivious to their rights.
166
  
¶77  Big data has reinvigorated the specter of massive data silos accumulating and using 
information for obscure purposes. Individuals and regulators do not condemn big data as 
such; rather, they oppose “secret big data,” which raises a Kafkaesque vision of an 
inhumane bureaucracy.
167
 Avoiding potential abuses may require retrofitting 
transparency obligations and providing more practicable access rights. Any activity 
performed in the dark raises suspicion of being untoward; what is done in broad daylight 
must be wholesome and “clean.”  
¶78  The call for transparency is not new, of course. Rather the emphasis is on access to 
data in a usable format, which can work to create value to individuals. Transparency and 
access alone have not emerged as potent tools because individuals do not care for, and 
cannot afford to indulge in, transparency and access for their own sake without any 
tangible benefit. For this reason, consumers seldom opt in or opt out of end user license 
agreements (EULA) or privacy policies, regardless of their merits.
168
 The enabler of 
transparency and access is the ability to use the information and benefit from it in a 
tangible way. Such use and benefit may be achieved through “featurization” or “app-
ification” of privacy. Useful access to PII will engage individuals, invite scrutiny of 
organizations’ information practices, and thus expose potential misuses of data. It would 
be value-minimizing to leave this opportunity untapped. Organizations should build as 
many dials and levers as needed for individuals to engage with their data. 
¶79  The extent of transparency and access espoused in this article will no doubt raise 
serious legal and business complexities. First, organizations (particularly non-consumer 
facing ones) may argue that in many circumstances providing individual access to 
massive databases distributed across numerous servers and containing zettabytes of de-
identified data is simply not practical. Second, to avoid the creation of a bigger privacy 
problem than it seeks to solve, direct online accessibility to data requires strong 
authentication as well as secure channeling, imposing costs and inconveniences on both 
organizations and individuals. Third, as the ecosystem for personal information expands, 
building layers upon layers of user-side applications over the existing centralized 
structure, data security risks of leakage and unauthorized use increase correspondingly. 
Finally, access to machine-readable data in a usable format appears to promote data 
portability, a contentious concept which raises further questions regarding intellectual 
property and antitrust. While further work is required to address these concerns, these 
issues can be contained.   
¶80  First, if data were in fact robustly de-identified, it would be counterproductive to 
require their re-identification simply in order to provide individuals with access.
169
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precisely such circumstances the risk to individuals’ privacy would be greatly reduced. 
Access is most needed where de-identification is weak and the data could therefore 
provide tangible benefits to individuals. Here, too, the flexibility and modularity of the 
FIPPs’ framework proves instrumental: as the degree of data identification increases, so 
should the level of access rights provided to individuals.   
¶81  Second, privacy and data security clearly require that an individual be granted 
access only to his or her personal data. This means that organizations must authenticate 
the identity of an individual making a request and that data must be delivered on a secure 
channel. Implementation may require use of digital signatures and similar identity 
infrastructures already in existence today, as well as encrypted communication delivery 
channels.  
¶82  Third, the enhancement of big data with interfaces for user interaction increases the 
number of access points and correspondingly elevates the risk of security breach and data 
leakage.
170
 Yet, that risk is a price worth paying where the goal is data empowerment of 
individuals. This article disputes the contention that individuals should not be allowed to 
access their information simply to avoid a potential data leak. To argue otherwise is 
tantamount to suggesting that a bank should bar customers’ access to their accounts to 
avoid losing their money.    
¶83  Finally, although similar to the data portability argument, this article stops short of 
advocating portability.
171
 It recognizes that portability is not, strictly speaking, a concept 
of privacy law but rather one derived from antitrust. It regards personal information as an 
asset of individuals, which remains under their control unless traded for a fair price. 
Although the proposed European Data Protection Regulation seeks to weave portability 
into the fabric of privacy law,
172
 this article contends such an approach may go too far. 
The property metaphor fails to capture the psychological and sociological nuance of the 
right to privacy. As Julie Cohen wrote a decade ago, “[r]ecognizing property rights in 
personally-identified data risks enabling more, not less, trade and producing less, not 
more, privacy.”
173
 Moreover, a right to portability could eviscerate the competitive 
advantage gained by companies that have invested significant skill and resources to 
collect, organize, and share data in commercially valuable ways, thereby stifling 
innovation. Companies vying for control of information markets could use it strategically 
to corner their competitors. Personal information should be regarded as neither an 
exclusive asset of individuals—treatment which may impinge on business trade secrets 
and intellectual property rights—nor exclusively the property of businesses, excluding 
individuals from benefiting. Rather, personal information should be treated as a valuable 
joint resource and a basis for value creation and innovation.   
¶84  Privacy suffers not only when individuals are unaware of data practices, but also 
when they are uninterested or disengaged. Such an environment, regardless of the 
regulatory mechanisms in place, provides insufficient checks on data collection and use. 
Where individuals can access data in a manner that is engaging, useful, or valuable, they 
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will give rise to natural checks on inappropriate behavior, thus serving as a useful 
compliance mechanism for privacy law. 
B. Enhanced Transparency: Shining the Light 
¶85  Policymakers have long struggled to draw the line for ethical data use.174 The 
discussion has historically revolved around the definition of “sensitive data.” Yet, any 
attempt to exhaustively define categories of sensitivity typically failed, given the highly 
contextual nature of personal information. For example, the first data protection case 
taken by the European Court of Justice, the matter of Bodil Lindqvist,
175
 dealt with the 
use of “sensitive” information so benign so as to appear trivial—the fact that the 
defendant’s fellow churchgoer had a broken leg. A broken leg is clearly a medical 
condition, which is a category of sensitive data under any legal framework;
176
 yet, 
information about an individual’s broken leg is not generally considered to be sensitive in 
nature.  
¶86  In order to delimit the zone of ethical data analysis we propose that organizations 
reveal not only the existence of their databases but also the criteria used in their decision-
making processes, subject to protection of trade secrets and other intellectual property 
laws.
177
 Today, such disclosures are made only when a user is presented with a consumer 
privacy policy, and even then the logic behind some of the automated processes remains 
opaque. Louis Brandeis, who together with Samuel Warren introduced the right to 
privacy into legal discourse in 1890,
178
 has also written that “[s]unlight is said to be the 
best of disinfectants . . . .”
179
 We trust if the existence and uses of databases were visible 
to the public, organizations would be more likely to avoid unethical or socially 
unacceptable uses of data. If organizations were required to disclose their line of 
reasoning in data processing operations impacting individuals’ lives, they might avoid 
unethical uses of data pertaining to certain populations, such as children, and certain data 
such as legally suspect categories—including gender, age, and race—or sensitive data (in 
the parochial sense), such as sexual preferences or certain medical conditions.  
¶87  More broadly, the requirement that organizations reveal their decisional criteria is 
based on the FIPPs’ transparency and accuracy principles. In a big data world, what calls 
for scrutiny is often not the accuracy of the raw data but rather the accuracy of the 
inferences drawn from the data. Inaccurate, manipulative, or discriminatory conclusions 
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may be drawn from perfectly innocuous, accurate data. The observer in big data analysis 
can affect the results of her research by defining the data set, proposing a hypothesis, or 
writing an algorithm. At the end of the day, big data analysis is an interpretative process, 
in which one’s identity and perspective informs one’s results. Like any interpretative 
process, it is subject to error, inaccuracy, and bias.
180
 
¶88  The requirement that organizations disclose their decisional criteria (not necessarily 
the algorithms, but rather the factors they consider) highlights an important fault line 
between law and technology. Fairness and due process mandate that individuals are 
informed of the basis for decisions affecting their lives, particularly those made by 
machines operating under opaque criteria. In the landmark Daubert case, the Supreme 
Court charged trial judges with the responsibility of acting as gatekeepers to exclude 
unreliable scientific expert testimony.
181
 Following Daubert, Justice Scalia remarked in 
Melendez-Diaz that “[f]orensic evidence is not uniquely immune from the risk of 
manipulation.”
182
 This was in response to the government’s assertion that “there is a 
difference, for Confrontation Clause purposes, between testimony recounting historical 
events, which is ‘prone to distortion or manipulation,’ and the testimony at issue here, 
which is the ‘resul[t] of neutral, scientific testing.’”
183
 We argue that not only the 
accused, but also any other citizen be afforded a right to confront decisions made about 
her. Daubert and its progeny mandate that, at the end of the day, it is lawyers and judges, 
not technology, who try individuals.
184
  
¶89  The rule proposed in this article focuses regulatory attention on the decision-
makers who draw conclusions from personal information rather than other parties in the 
ecosystem. In doing so, it recognizes that some of the risks of big data affect fairness, 
equality and other values, which may be no less important than—but are theoretically 
distinct from—core privacy interests. Over the past few years, the debate over privacy 
has become conflated with broader social values. For example, the increasing tendency of 
employers to use social networking services to run background checks on prospective job 
candidates has led critics to condemn the “privacy invasive” nature of such platforms.
185
 
Yet on closer scrutiny, it is not clear that social networking services should be held 
accountable for illegal or unethical discrimination by employers. If an employer chooses 
to screen out job candidates based on race, good looks,
186
 or proclivity to drink,
187
 then 
that employer—not the neutral platform used to convey such information—should stand 
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to blame. Accordingly, it is prospective employers—or, in other contexts, insurers, banks 
and government agencies
188
—that need to explain their decisional criteria in reaching 
personal data driven conclusions.  
¶90  Finally, attention must be given to the accessibility of big data sets to the research 
community at large.
189
 Traditionally, when scientists published their research, they also 
made the underlying data available so that other scientists could verify the results. Yet 
with big data, it is often only the employees of certain organizations that benefit from 
access, conducting analysis and publishing results without making the underlying data 
publicly available.
190
 Such scientists may argue, first, that the data are a proprietary asset 
of their business. Indeed, they may claim that disclosing the data could infringe 
customers’ privacy.
191
 As boyd and Crawford note, future research must address relevant, 
fundamental questions, such as who has the right to access big data sets, for what 
purposes, in what contexts, and with what constraints.
192
 Without good answers, we may 




¶91  Privacy advocates and data regulators increasingly decry the era of big data as they 
observe the growing ubiquity of data collection and increasingly robust uses of data 
enabled by powerful processors and unlimited storage holders. Researchers, businesses, 
and entrepreneurs equally vehemently point to concrete or anticipated innovations that 
may be dependent on the default collection of large data sets.  
¶92  This article has called for the development of a legal model where the benefits of 
data for organizations and researchers are shared with individuals. If organizations 
provide individuals with access to their data in usable formats, creative powers will be 
unleashed to provide users with applications and features building on their data for new 
innovative uses. In addition, transparency with respect to the logic underlying 
organizations’ data processing will deter unethical, sensitive data use and allay concerns 
about inaccurate inferences. Traditional transparency and individual access mechanisms 
have proven to be an ineffective means for motivating individuals to engage their data. 
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The promise of new benefits and value sharing propositions will incentivize individuals 
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